Another look at creativity and intelligence: Exploring higher-order models and probable confounds. by NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro & Silvia, Paul
Another look at creativity and intelligence: Exploring higher-order models and probable confounds  
 
By: Paul J. Silvia 
 
Silvia, P. J. (2008). Another look at creativity and intelligence: Exploring higher-order models and probable  
 confounds. Personality and Individual Differences, 44, 1012-1021. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2007.10.027     
 
Made available courtesy of Elsevier: 
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/603/description 
 
***Note: Figures may be missing from this format of the document 
 
Abstract: 
How strongly is creativity related to intelligence? Although a large body of work has found a small relationship 
between them, there are reasons to suspect that their relationship has been underestimated. Most studies have 
assessed creativity and intelligence with observed scores, not as latent variables, and few studies have examined 
higher-order latent intelligence factors. A sample of university students (n = 226) completed divergent thinking 
tasks and measures of fluid reasoning, verbal fluency, and strategy generation. Creativity was modestly related 
to the three lower-order cognitive factors, but it was substantially related (β = .43) to a higher-order intelligence 
factor composed of the lower-order factors. This effect declined (β = .26) when openness to experience, a likely 
confounding variable, was considered. 
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Article: 
1. Exploring higher-order models and probable confounds 
Are creative people smart? The relation between creativity and intelligence is a venerable problem in the 
psychology of creativity. (Guilford, 1950) and (Guilford, 1967) made seminal contributions to both fields, and 
the overlap between creativity and intelligence received book-length treatment in two classic works ([Getzels 
and Jackson, 1962] and [Wallach and Kogan, 1965]). The distinction was significant in enriching the notion of 
childhood giftedness (Getzels & Jackson, 1962), motivating the development of better measures of creativity 
(Wallach & Kogan, 1965), and suggesting the viability of interventions to enhance creativity. Modern research 
continues to explore, synthesize, and evaluate the relation between creativity and intelligence ([Kim, 2005], 
[Preckel et al., 2006], [Sligh et al., 2005] and [Sternberg and O’Hara, 1999]).  
 
The present paper takes a new look at the relation between creativity and intelligence. A recent meta-analysis 
found a modest relation between them (r = .17; Kim, 2005), but there are good reasons to think that the relation 
has been underestimated. Advanced multivariate techniques were not widely available until relatively recently 
([Kline, 2005] and [Loehlin, 2004]), and most studies have focused on observed measures of lower-order 
intelligence factors, not the higher-order latent g factor. But there are also good reasons to think that the relation 
has been overestimated. Most research has been guilty of neglecting third variables that could predict both 
intelligence and creativity. People high in openness to experience, for example, are both more intelligent 
(DeYoung, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005) and more creative (King, Walker, & Broyles, 1996). 
A large sample latent variable study examined the relationship between intelligence and creativity, using 
measures and statistical methods intended to overcome some of the limitations of past research. We explored 
two questions. First, is the relation between creativity and intelligence strengthened when some of the 
methodological and statistical limitations of past research are addressed? Second, is the relation between 
creativity and intelligence weakened when plausible third variables are considered? 
 
2. Underestimating and overestimating intelligence 
There’s good reason to believe that past work has underestimated the relationship between intelligence and 
creativity. Most research has estimated correlations between observed measures of the constructs; latent 
variable analysis wasn’t available when much of the research was conducted. It is hard to overstate the value of 
latent variable models for studying individual differences (see Loehlin, 2004). Researchers can pool information 
from multiple measures, use measures with different methods, and model the sources of error variance. Latent 
variable analyses, in general, will find stronger relationships than analyses of observed variables (Coffman & 
MacCallum, 2005). For example, a latent variable reanalysis of Wallach and Kogan’s (1965) classic study 
found a correlation of r = .20 (Silvia, in press), which is higher than Wallach and Kogan’s original correlational 
analysis (r = .09) and higher than the meta-analytic average of studies that used their tasks (r = .12; Kim, 2005, 
p. 61). 
 
Furthermore, latent variable models allow researchers to estimate higher-order latent factors, such as a latent g 
factor composed of lower-order latent factors. General intelligence is the abstract factor that explains why 
diverse cognitive tests correlate, not the specific factors measured by the tests (Carroll, 1993). Strictly speaking, 
testing the relationship between intelligence and creativity would require modeling intelligence as a higher-
order, general factor composed of lower-order cognitive skills. Few studies, however, have done so. 
 
On the other hand, one could expect that the relationship between intelligence and creativity has been 
overstated. Intelligence and creativity share relationships with other variables, and there are good reasons to 
think that third variables confound the relationship between them. Of the major dimensions of personality, 
openness to experience has the strongest and most consistent relationship with intelligence (Chamorro-Premuzic 
& Furnham, 2006). Many studies have found that people high in openness score higher on measures of 
intelligence (e.g., DeYoung et al., 2005). In lexical studies of personality, the openness factor often resembles 
an intelligence factor (De Raad, 1994). Openness is also a strong predictor of creativity ([Feist, 1998], [Feist, 
2006], [King et al., 1996], [McCrae, 1987] and [Weisberg, 2006]), so it is reasonable to suspect that openness to 
experience confounds correlations between intelligence and creativity. 
 
3. The present research 
The present study examines the relationships between intelligence and creativity while addressing some 
limitations of past research. First, all of the constructs were modeled as latent variables, which should offer 
cleaner estimates of their relationships. Second, intelligence was modeled as a higher-order latent variable 
composed of lower-order latent factors. This model will show if intelligence predicts creativity more strongly 
when it is assessed at a more abstract, general level. And finally, we explored if including openness to 
experience diminished the relationship between intelligence and creativity. If so, then openness would appear to 
be a ―third variable‖ that explains the relationship. 
 
4. Method 
4.1. Participants 
The data were taken from the creativity and cognition project, which was first described in Silvia et al. (in 
press). A total of 242 college students completed a wide range of measures of creativity, personality, 
knowledge, and cognitive abilities. After excluding people with limited English proficiency and extensive 
missing data, we had a final sample of 226 people (178 women, 48 men). Most of the participants (82%) were 
18 or 19 years old. The most common college majors in the sample were nursing (31%), undeclared (11%), and 
biology (5%). Around 9% of the sample had a major related to the arts (e.g., majors such as music, theatre, fine 
art, dance, and interior architecture), and less than 3% of the sample majored in psychology. 
 
4.2. Procedure 
People participated in groups of 1–13; they completed several measures of cognitive abilities and creativity. The 
tasks were completed in the order in which they are described. 
 
4.3. Creativity 
Two unusual uses tasks — uses for a brick and uses for a knife — were administered to measure individual 
differences in creativity. An earlier generalizability analysis found that unusual uses tasks produce dependable 
scores (Silvia et al., in press, Study 1). The experimenter told the participants that the tasks assessed how people 
come up with creative ideas. The participants were told to try to come up with creative responses. These 
instructions were intended to raise the ceiling of creativity, expand the variance in creativity scores, and 
enhance the validity of the tasks as measures of individual differences (see [Christensen et al., 1957], 
[Harrington, 1975] and [Runco et al., 2005]). After completing each task, the experimenter asked the 
participants to review their responses and to circle the two that they thought were their two most creative 
responses. 
 
Three raters independently judged the responses on a 1–5 scale (1 = not at all creative, 5 = very creative). Prior 
to rating, each response was entered into a database and then sorted alphabetically. As a result, the raters were 
unaware of which person gave the response, whether a response was picked as a ―top two‖ response, the 
person’s other responses, the serial order of the response within the set, and the person’s total number of 
responses. Ratings of these ―top two scores‖ served as the measure of creativity (Silvia et al., in press, Study 2). 
First suggested by Michael and Wright (1989), this approach (1) controls for the number of responses that make 
up each person’s score and (2) assesses people’s level of creativity based on their best responses. 
 
4.4. Intelligence 
4.4.1. Fluid reasoning 
One first-order factor was fluid reasoning, the ability to solve novel problems and to induce rules and patterns 
(Carroll, 1993). Three tasks assessed fluid reasoning: (1) the 18 odd-numbered items from the Raven’s 
Progressive Matrices (12 min); (2) a 16 item Letter Sets task, in which people discern which set of four letters 
violates a rule followed by other sets of letters (4 min); and (3) a 10-item Paper Folding test, in which people 
decide how folded sheets of paper would appear when mentally unfolded (4 min). The Paper Folding task and 
Letter Sets task were taken from the Kit of Factor-Referenced Tests (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 
1976). 
 
4.4.2. Verbal fluency 
A second first-order factor was verbal fluency, the ability to retrieve words based on a rule ([Bousfield and 
Sedgewick, 1944] and [Troyer et al., 1997]). Two tasks measured letter fluency: people were asked to generate 
all of the words they could think of that started with the letter F and the letter M. Two tasks measured semantic 
fluency: people were asked to generate as many kinds of animals and as many occupations as possible. People 
had 2 min for each task; they completed them in F, animals, M, occupations order. People were told that 
duplications of roots (e.g., forty, forty-one) and proper names would not count. 
 
4.4.3. Strategy generation 
A third first-order factor was composed of three strategy generation tasks. Developed by Phillips (1999), these 
tasks ask participants to generate successful strategies for a verbal fluency task. For example, one task told 
people to imagine that they were asked to list as many parts of the body as possible. People then had to list 
strategies that would help them list a lot of parts of the body, such as ―starting at the top and working down‖ 
and ―list parts based on the body’s systems.‖ Performance on this task requires generating novel rules; it 
correlates highly with other measures of intelligence (Phillips, 1999), and it appears to capture both verbal and 
fluid aspects of intelligence. We used three tasks: strategies for listing parts of the body, examples of food, and 
countries in the world. People had 2 min for each task. The tasks were scored by counting the number of distinct 
strategies that people generated. 
 
4.5. Openness to experience 
Openness to experience was measured with three self-report scales. People completed the 12-item Openness 
scale from Costa and McCrae’s (1992) Five Factor Inventory (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree); a 10-
item Openness scale (1 = very inaccurate description of me, 5 = very accurate description of me) formed from 
the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg et al., 2006); and the 2-item Openness scale from 
Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann’s (2003) brief Big 5 scale (1 = very inaccurate description of me, 5 = very 
accurate description of me). Cronbach’s alpha was strongest for the IPIP scale (.83), lower for the NEO scale 
(.67), and lowest for the 2-item brief scale (.30). 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Analysis overview 
The analyses were conducted with Mplus 4.21, using full-information maximum likelihood estimation. The 
higher-order model is shown in Fig. 1. To assess construct reliability — also known as maximal reliability 
(Drewes, 2000) — for each latent factor, we estimated H, which indicates ―the degree to which the indicators 
can capture information about the underlying factor‖ (Gagné & Hancock, 2006, p. 68). Creativity (H = .39) was 
modeled as a higher-order latent variable composed of two lower-order latent variables: one for the brick task 
(H = .79), and one for the knife task (H = .78). The paths to brick and knife were constrained to be equal for 
identification, and the variance of Creativity was set to 1. The three judges’ ratings of people’s top-two scores 
were the indicators. The paths to Rater 2 were set to 1, and the paths for Raters 1 and 3 were nearly identical 
and thus were constrained to be equal. General Intelligence (H = .65) was also modeled as a higher-order latent 
variable: it was composed of Fluid Reasoning (H = .65), Verbal Fluency (H = .73), and Strategy Generation 
(H = .69). The variances of the lower-order factors were set to 1. Because even small effects are significant with 
a large sample, we describe our findings in terms of small (around β = 10), medium (around β = .30), and large 
(around β = .50) effect sizes. 
 
5.2. Creativity and the lower-order factors 
We first examined the relationships between the lower-order cognitive factors — fluid intelligence, verbal 
fluency, and strategy generation — and creativity. This analysis provided a useful comparison to the analysis of 
higher-order intelligence and creativity, which is shown in Fig. 1. We regressed creativity on fluid intelligence, 
verbal fluency, strategy generation, and gender (scored 1 for men, 2 for women). The model fit well 
(RMSEA = .026, SRMR = .048, CFI = .98, χ
2
/df = 1.15), and it explained 14.4% of the variance in creativity. 
The effect sizes were small to moderate. Fluid intelligence had the largest relationship with creativity (β = .24); 
verbal fluency (β = .16), strategy generation (β = .09), and gender (β = −.13) all had small effects. All told, then, 
the lower-order cognitive factors had modest relationships with creativity, consistent with the typical effects 
found in Kim’s (2005) meta-analysis. 
 
5.3. Creativity and general intelligence 
Did general intelligence predict creativity? Earlier we suggested that the intelligence–creativity relation may be 
stronger when intelligence is modeled at a higher level of abstraction. We thus regressed creativity on general 
intelligence (as depicted in Fig. 1) and gender. This model fit well (RMSEA = .027, SRMR = .051, CFI = .98, 
χ
2
/df = 1.16), and it explained 18.4% of the variance in creativity. The higher-order intelligence factor had a 
medium-to-large effect on creativity (β = .43); gender had a smaller effect (β = −.18). The effect of general 
intelligence was much larger than the effects of the lower-order factors, indicating that the abstract, general 
factor of intelligence is more relevant to creativity than the specific factors. 
 
5.4. Creativity, openness, and general intelligence 
Thus far, we have found that a higher-order factor of intelligence relates substantially to creativity, much more 
so than the typical effect found in past research (Kim, 2005). Is this effect independent of third variables, such 
as openness to experience? To appraise the unique relationship between intelligence and creativity, we added a 
latent Openness to Experience variable (composed of the three self-report scales; H = .77) to the model shown 
in Fig. 1. Creativity was regressed on intelligence, openness, and gender. This model fit well (RMSEA = .03, 
SRMR = .052, CFI = .97, χ
2
/df = 1.20), and it explained 32.6% of the variance in creativity. Openness 
correlated significantly with intelligence (β = .32), and it had a medium-to-large effect on creativity (β = .43). 
The higher-order intelligence factor had smaller effect on creativity (β = .26) when openness was in the model; 
gender had a very small effect (β = −.07). It appears that openness partly accounts for the relation between 
intelligence and creativity: the effect of intelligence declined when openness was entered (from β = .43 to 
β = .26), but the effect nevertheless remained medium in size. 
 
6. General discussion 
The psychometric approach has been interested in the relationship between intelligence and creativity since 
(Guilford, 1950) and (Guilford, 1967) pioneering research. The present research was motivated by two 
questions. First, has the creativity–intelligence relationship been underestimated? Second, does intelligence 
uniquely predict creativity when possible confounds are considered? Regarding the first question, past research 
has probably underestimated the creativity–intelligence relationship. When intelligence is modeled as a higher-
order latent variable, it has a much stronger relationship to creativity than the typical effect found in past work 
(r = .17; Kim, 2005). Estimating a higher-order factor of intelligence appreciably boosts the relationship, 
indicating that studies of lower-order factors may provide misleading estimates of the true effect size. 
 
Regarding the second question, the relationship between creativity and intelligence is due in part to other 
variables. Including openness to experience — a variable that predicts both intelligence and creativity — 
deflated intelligence’s relationship with creativity. But the effect remained medium in size, suggesting that 
openness does not fully explain the relationship. Nevertheless, creativity researchers should consider possible 
personality confounds when examining cognitive aspects of creativity. Chamorro-Premuzic and Furnham 
(2006) pointed out that the psychology of intelligence and the psychology of personality developed from 
different traditions in differential psychology, and only recently have psychologists considered them jointly. 
Understanding how cognitive abilities and personality traits collectively influence creative abilities is an 
important goal for future research. 
 
The findings of the present study ought to be viewed in light of the occasionally weak reliability of the 
measures or constructs. The brief openness scale designed by Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann (2003) had 
surprisingly poor internal consistency, even for a 2-item scale. Some of the latent constructs, such as the latent 
higher-order creativity and intelligence variables, had relatively weak H values. Each latent factor was defined 
by widely-used tasks or scales, so it is unlikely that the models are severely mis-specified. These low H values 
are probably due to having only 2 or 3 indicators for most of the factors; all else equal, H increases as the 
number of indicators increases (Gagné & Hancock, 2006). Future work can enhance the construct reliability of 
creativity by including more indicators, such as by administering more creativity tasks and having more raters 
score each task. 
 
This study used divergent thinking to represent individual differences in creativity. Divergent thinking tasks are 
among the oldest and most popular tasks in scientific research on creativity (e.g., Wilson, Guilford, & 
Christensen, 1953), but they are controversial (see Kaufman & Baer, 2005). Several researchers — particularly 
researchers from traditions that view creativity in terms of problem solving (Weisberg, 2006) and sociocultural 
factors (Sawyer, 2006) — are skeptical of the value of divergent thinking specifically and of the notion of 
individual differences in creativity more generally. It’s worth noting that most of the foundational research on 
individual differences in divergent thinking was conducted prior to the development of advanced psychometric 
and multivariate methods (Runco, 2007). Given the strengths of contemporary methods, modern research may 
reveal stronger evidence for the validity of divergent thinking (Silvia et al., in press). Regardless, this debate 
cannot be settled by any single study; only the accumulation of research will reveal whether divergent thinking 
is a fruitful scientific construct. 
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